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Abstract. This paper deals with the use of the CAPM for investment decisions and evaluations. Four 
different measures are deductively drawn from this model: the disequilibrium Net Present Value, the 
equilibrium Net Present Value, the disequilibrium Net Future Value, the equilibrium Net Future Value. It is 
shown that all of them may be used for accept-reject decisions, but only the equilibrium Net Present Value 
and the disequilibrium Net Future Value may be used for valuation, given that they enjoy the additivity 
property. The two nonadditive indexes cannot be deducted from the CAPM assumptions if the decision 
problem “invest/no invest” is reframed as “invest in Z/invest in Y”. Despite their additivity, the equilibrium 
Net Present Value and the disequilibrium Net Future Value are unreliable for both valuation and decision, 
because they do not signal arbitrage opportunities whenever there is some state of nature for which they are 
decreasing functions with respect to the end-of-period cash flow. In this case, the equilibrium value of a 
project is not the price it would have if it were traded in the security market. This result is the capital-
budgeting counterpart of Dybvig and Ingersoll’s (1982) result.  
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CAPM and capital budgeting: present versus future, equilibrium 
versus disequilibrium, decision versus valuation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The use of the CAPM for capital budgeting purposes traces back to the 60s and 70s, when various authors 
developed a theoretical link between this asset pricing model and corporate capital budgeting decisions. 
Among the several contributions we find classical papers of foremost authorities such as Tuttle and 
Litzenberger (1968), Hamada (1969), Mossin (1969), Litzenberger and Budd (1970), Stapleton (1971, 
1974), Rubinstein (1973), Bierman and Hass (1973, 1974), Bogue and Roll (1974). The decision criteria 
these authors present are seemingly different, but, logically, they are equivalent (see Senbet and Thompson, 
1978) and may be framed in terms of risk-adjusted cost of capital (see Magni, 2007a): the resulting capital 
budgeting criterion suggests that, as long as the CAPM assumptions are met, a firm aiming at maximizing 
share price should undertake a project if and only if the project’s risk-adjusted cost of capital exceeds the 
project’s expected internal rate of return. These classical papers are aimed at formally deducting a decision 
rule from the CAPM, but do not particularly focus on project valuation; although the net-present-value rule 
is often reminded, no explicit claim appears that the risk-adjusted cost of capital may or may not be used 
for valuing projects. The risk-adjusted cost of capital is presented as depending on a disequilibrium (cost-
based) systematic risk (see Rubinstein, 1973), but project value is often framed in a certainty-equivalent 
form (Bogue and Roll, 1974), which implies that an equilibrium systematic risk is used. As a result, 
ambiguities arise on the use of the project NPV as a decision rule or as a valuation tool, and uncertainties 
arise regarding the correct calculation of the NPV, using either the equilibrium or the disequilibrium 
systematic risk. Furthermore, while most of the contributions deal with net present values, no thorough 
analysis is found in the literature concerning the relation between present value and excess return (but see 
Weston and Chen, 1980). Few contributions have drawn attention on these topics. Among these, we find 
Rendleman’s (1978) paper, which deals with the use of cost-based (disequilibrium) covariance terms as 
opposed to market-determined (equilibrium) covariance terms. The author suggests that if a firm were to 
rank projects on the basis of excess of internal return over equilibrium (market-determined) return, an 
incorrect decision would be reached. Haley and Schall (1979, pp. 182-183) show that the disequilibrium 
NPV is unreliable in ranking projects. Weston and Chen (1980) state that either the disequilibrium or 
equilibrium return may be used for ranking projects, if appropriate use is made of both. And while the 
equilibrium form of NPV is widespread for valuation purposes (in the classical certainty-equivalent form), 
the disequilibrium form of NPV has its own upholders as well among scholars. For example, Lewellen 
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(1977) uses the disequilibrium NPV to value projects; Copeland and Weston use cost-based betas, and 
therefore disequilibrium NPVs, for valuing projects in various occasions (Copeland and Weston, 1983, 
1988, Weston and Copeland, 1988); Bossaerts and Ødegaard (2001) endorse the use of the disequilibrium 
NPV for valuing projects. Some other authors are aware that the disequilibrium NPV is often used in 
finance, and warn against it claiming that this kind of NPV is a common misuse of the NPV rule: Ang and 
Lewellen (1982, p. 9) explicitly claim that the disequilibrium NPV is the “standard discounting approach” 
in finance for valuing projects, and show that such a method is incorrect for it leads to nonadditive 
valuations. Grinblatt and Titman (1998), being aware that the use of disequilibrium NPVs is extensive,  
present an example where cost-based betas are used (see their example 10.5) and claim that their example 
deliberately shows an incorrect procedure. Ekern (2006) distinguishes between NPV as a decision rule and 
NPV as a valuation tool; he states that the disequilibrium NPV is correct for decision but not for valuation, 
and suggests the use of the equilibrium NPV as well as other several equivalent methods. Magni (2007b) 
focuses on the relation between disequilibrium NPV and absence of arbitrage, showing that while 
deductively valid as a decision tool, the former is incompatible with the latter.  
 This paper, limiting its scope to one-period projects and accept-reject situations, aims at giving 
some clarification on these topics. In particular it shows that three conceptual categories are involved when 
the CAPM is used for capital budgeting: equilibrium/disequilibrium, present/future, decision/valuation. 
The results obtained inform that if the CAPM assumptions are met in the security market and a firm’s 
objective is to maximize share price, the investor may reliably employ either present of future values, either 
in equilibrium or disequilibrium format, as long as the resulting values are used for decision-making 
purposes. If, instead, the purpose is valuation, only the disequilibrium NFV and the equilibrium NPV may 
be used, because the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are not additive. This also makes their 
use unsafe for decision-making as well: whenever decision makers face a portfolio of projects (or a project 
composed of several sub-projects) they may separately compute each project’s NPV (NFV) and then sum 
the values obtained or sum the cash flows and then compute the portfolio NPV. Changing the order in 
which summation and discounting are made, different results are obtained. This result is a conundrum, 
because two nonadditive indexes are validly deducted from the CAPM assumptions. However, the same 
two indexes may not be deducted if the decision problem is reframed: instead of coping with the problem 
“invest in project Z/do not invest in project Y” one may consider the problem “invest in project Z/invest in 
alternative Y”. The latter case is more general and it boils down to the former case whenever “project Y” is 
the null alternative, that is, the project with zero cash flows. This makes the equilibrium NPV and the 
disequilibrium NFV the only capital budgeting criteria validly deducted from the CAPM. Nevertheless, 
despite their additivity, they have serious pitfalls as well: if there is a state of nature for which they are 
decreasing functions with respect to the end-of-period cash flow, then valuation (and decision) is 
unreliable. This result is just the capital-budgeting version of a result found in Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) 
concerning asset pricing in complete markets, and explains why the equilibrium value of a project is not 
always the price it would have if it were traded in the security market. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 definitions of net present values and net future values, in 
either equilibrium or disequilibrium format, are given. In section 2 four decision criteria are formally 
deducted assuming that the CAPM assumptions are met. In section 3 the equilibrium NPV and the 
disequilibrium NFV are shown to be additive, whereas the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV 
are shown to be nonadditive. Section 4 shows that by reframing the decision problem the nonadditive 
measures are dismissed. Section 5 shows that additivity does not guarantee absence of arbitrage and that 
the two additive measures previously found may be in some cases misleading. Section 6 shows that the 
equilibrium value of a project is not necessarily the value a project would have if it were traded in the 
security market. Some remarks conclude the paper. 
Equilibrium in the security market is assumed throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified. To 
avoid pedantry, main notational conventions are placed in Table 0. 
 
1. Equilibrium and disequilibrium, present and future 
 
This section introduces the notions of Net Present Value (NPV) and Net Future Value (NFV) and shows 
that, under uncertainty, they are not univocal. 
 
 Under certainty, Net Present Value and Net Future Value are equivalent notions. In particular, let 
VZ = FZ /(1+i) be the project’s value, where i is the (opportunity) cost of capital. The NPV of a project Z 
with cost IZ  and end-of-period cash flow FZ  is given by 
i
FIVI ZZZZZ +
+−=+−=
1
NPV .     (1.1) 
The NFV of project Z is just the NPV compounded at the cost of capital: 
 
ZZZZ FiIi ++−=+= )1()1(NPVNFV .    (1.2) 
As 1/ −= ZZZ IFr  is the project rate of return, the NFV may be rewritten in excess-return form: 
 
ZZZ irI NFV)(return excess =−= .     (1.3) 
    
Therefore, the NPV is just the present value of the project excess return, calculated at the cost of capital: 
i
irI ZZ
Z +
−
=
1
)(NPV  .       (1.4) 
Under certainty, the NPV is the current project (net) value, the NFV (excess return) is the end-of-period 
project (net) value. In terms of decisions, the NPV and the NFV have the same sign (as long as (1+i) > 0) 
so that a project is worth undertaking if and only if the NPV and the NFV are positive. The NPV and NFV 
are twin notions: both may interchangeably be used as decision rules and valuation tools. 
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Under uncertainty, if the CAPM is used for measuring risk, the notions of NPV and NFV (and the very 
notion of value) are not univocal. Depending on whether disequilibrium covariance terms or equilibrium 
covariance terms are used, we find disequilibrium or equilibrium NPVs and NFVs. We then give the 
following definitions: 
 
Definition 1.1. The disequilibrium NPV (dNPV) is the net discounted expected cash flow, where the 
discount rate is the disequilibrium (cost-based) rate of return of the project ZmZfdZ IrFrr /),cov(λ+= : 
   Z
mZ
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
I
λR
F
−
+
=
)(cov
:dNPV .    (1.5) 
The first addend is the disequilibrium value of the project, so that ZdZZ IV −=:dNPV .  
 
Definition 1.2. The equilibrium NPV (eNPV) is the net discounted expected cash flow, where the discount 
rate is the equilibrium rate of return eZmZfeZ VrFrr /),cov(λ+=  (with eZV  being the equilibrium value 
of the project):  
 
Z
mZe
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
V
λR
F
−
+
=
)(cov
:eNPV .    (1.6) 
As widely known, we have ( ) fmZZeZ R,rFλFV /)(cov: −=  so that we may alternatively reframe the 
eNPV in a certainty-equivalent form 
Z
f
mZZ
Z IR
,rFλF
−
−
=
)(cov
:eNPV     (1.7) 
 
 
Using eq. (2.1) we give the following  
Definition 1.3. The disequilibrium NFV (dNFV) is given by the compounded disequilibrium Net Present 
Value: )/),cov((dNPV)1(dNPVdNFV ZmZfZdZZZ IrFRr λ+=+= . Therefore, we may write, in an 
excess-return format, 
( ) 





−−=−=
Z
mZ
fZZ
d
ZZZZ I
rF
rrIrrI
),cov(
:dNFV λ     (1.6) 
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Definition 1.4. The equilibrium NFV (eNFV) is  given by the compounded eNPVZ: 
)1(eNPVeNFV eZZZ r+= . Therefore, we may write, in an excess-return format, 
 
( )








−−=−=
e
Z
mZ
fZZ
e
ZZZZ
V
rF
rrIrrI
),cov(
eNFV λ    (1.9) 
 
or, using the relation ZZZZ IrIF =− , 
 
Ze
Z
mZ
fZZZ I
V
rF
rIF








+−−=
),cov()(eNFV λ .  (1.10) 
 
Remark 1.1 It is worth reminding that the project’s expected rate of return differs from both the 
disequilibrium rate of return and the equilibrium rate of return. For the sake of clarity, the three rates of 
return may be written as 
 
  
1−=
Z
Z
Z I
F
r       expected rate of return   (1.11) 
Z
mZfd
Z
Zd
Z
I
rF
r
V
F
r
),cov(1 λ+=−=    disequilibrium rate of return  (1.12) 
e
Z
mZfe
Z
Ze
Z
V
rF
r
V
F
r
),cov(1 λ+=−=    equilibrium rate of return  (1.13) 
 
(see also Weston and Chen, 1980, p. 12). The disequilibrium rate of return in (1.12) is the risk-adjusted 
cost of capital introduced in the classical contributions cited above (see Rubinstein, 1973, and Magni, 
2007a). Using (1.11)-(1.13), Table 1 collects various ways of representing NPVs and NFVs, in either 
equilibrium or disequilibrium format, which are equivalent to those presented in Definitions (1.1)-(1.4) 
above.1  
 The following section shows that the proliferation of measures under uncertainty, while surprising, 
is harmless in accept-reject decisions, for all of them are validly deducted by the CAPM and the 
assumption of share price maximization.  
                                                 
1
 It is worth reminding that if the project lies on the Security Market Line (SML), then eZdZZ VVI ==  and 
e
Z
d
ZZ rrr == , i.e. the three notions of rate of return collapse into one. 
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2. The four decision criteria 
 
This section shows that the four indexes above introduced are logically equivalent as decision rules in 
accept-reject situations. To begin with, we have the following 
 
Lemma 2.1 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . Then, after acceptance of the project, 
 
.)()(cov lllfmZZfZ PPNR,rFλIRF −=−− o     (2.1) 
 
Proof: Consider firm l. Before acceptance of the project, we have, due to the Security Market Line, 
)(cov mlfl ,rrλrr += . 
Reminding that lll VFr /1 =+ , we have 
)(cov mlf
l
l
,rrλR
V
F
+=  
and, multiplying by the firm value lV , we obtain 
).(cov)(cov mlllfmllfl ,rFλPNR,rFλVRF +=+=    (2.2) 
After acceptance of the project, the new equilibrium value is set as  
f
mZlZl
l R
,rFFλFFV )(cov +−+=o . 
The existing shares are lN , so the new resulting price 
o
lP  is such that 
oo
llZl PNIV =− , which 
determines 
l
Zl
l N
IV
P
−
=
o
o
. To actually make the investment the firm shall issue 
o
o
l
Z
l
P
I
N =  shares at the 
price olP .  The Security Market Line is now such that 
  







 +
+=
+
m
l
Zl
f
l
Zl
,r
V
FF
λR
V
FF
oo
cov  
whence 
)(cov mZllfZl r,FFλVRFF ++=+ o . 
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Having determined the new price olP  and the number olN of stocks issued, the latter boils down 
 
)(cov)( mZllllfZl ,rFFλPNNRFF +++=+ oo .    (2.3) 
Subtracting (2.3) from (2.2) we get to 
 
)(cov)()(cov mZllllfmlllfZ ,rFFλPNNR,rFλPNRF +−+−+=− oo  
and, using Zll IPN =
oo
, 
.)()(cov lllfmZZfZ PPNR,rFλIRF −=−− o  
Q.E.D. 
 
From Lemma 2.1, four decision rules are deducted. In particular, we have the following 
 
Proposition 2.1 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project disequilibrium Net Present Value is positive: 2  
 
0
)(cov
:dNPV >−
+
= Z
mZ
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
I
λR
F
.     (2.4) 
 
Proof: From eq. (2.1) we find 
).(cov lllfm
Z
ZfZZ PPNR,rI
F
λRIF −=











+− o  
 
whence 
.
cov
)(
cov 





+
−
=−






+ m
Z
Zf
lllf
Z
m
Z
Zf
Z
,r
I
F
λR
PPNR
I
,r
I
F
λR
F o
 
Therefore, 
 
ll PP >
o
 if and only if 0dNPV >=− ZZ
d
Z IV . 
                                                 
2
 It is assumed that fR  and ( )mZZf ,rFIλR cov)/(+  have equal sign. If this condition is not met, the thesis 
holds with the sign of (2.4) reversed. 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2.2 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project equilibrium Net Present Value is positive: 
 
0
)(cov
:eNPV >−
+
= Z
mZe
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
V
λR
F
.    (2.5) 
Proof: Using eq. (2.1) and the fact that eZfmZZ VR,rFλF =− )(cov , we have 
)( lllfZfeZf PPNRIRVR −=− o  
whence, dividing by fR , 
)(eNPV lllZ PPN −= o .     (2.6) 
Finally, we have 
ll PP >
o
 if and only if 0eNPV >Z . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2.3 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project disequilibrium Net Future Value is positive: 
 
( ) 0dNFV >−= dZZZZ rrI      (2.7) 
 
Proof: From eq. (2.1) we have 
)())(cov( lllfmZfZZ PPNR,rrλRIF −=+− o .   (2.8) 
Given that  
))(cov()(dNFV mZfZZdZZZZ ,rrλRIFrrI +−=−=    (2.9) 
 
we have 
 
ll PP >
o
 if and only if 0dNFV >Z . 
Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 2.4. Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project equilibrium Net Future Value is positive:3 
 
( ) 0eNFV >−= eZZZZ rrI .     (2.10) 
 
Proof: Using eq. (2.1) and the equalities )1/()(cov eZZfeZfmZZ rFRVR,rFλF +==− , we have 
 
)(
)1( lllfZfeZ
Zf PPNRIR
r
FR −=−
+
o
 
 
and therefore 
)()1()1( lllfeZZeZffZ PPNRrIrRRF −+=+− o . 
whence, dividing by fR , 
)()1()1( llleZeZZZ PPNrrIF −+=+− o  
which leads to 
ll PP >
o
 if and only if 0eNFV >Z . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Remark 2.1 Propositions 2.1-2.4 show four ways of using the CAPM for capital budgeting purposes. All 
of them are CAPM-consistent. In particular, it is worth stressing that: (a) the disequilibrium NPV is indeed 
a correct decision rule, despite some claims against its use (e.g. De Reyck, 2005); (b) the Net Present Value 
rule may be safely replaced by a Net Future Value (excess return) rule, either in equilibrium or 
disequilibrium format. 
 
Remark 2.2 The results obtained have some practical consequences. In real life, investors face several 
different situations in capital budgeting. In particular, information about the project may be extensive or 
partial so that project analysis may or may not rely on a scenario basis, and there may or may not be assets 
in the security market having economic characteristics similar to those of the project under consideration 
(representative assets). If appropriate information on the project is available (so that scenario analysis is 
possible) and/or there are not representative assets in the market, the investor must rely on an ex ante 
probability distribution to compute the covariance between the end-of-period cash flow and the market 
                                                 
3
 It is here assumed )1( eZr+ >0. If this condition is not met, then the thesis holds with the sign of (2.10) reversed. 
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return, ZmZ I,rF )/(cov ; this means that he will equivalently employ the disequilibrium NPV or the 
disequilibrium NFV to decide whether investing or not in the project. If appropriate information is 
somehow lacking and there are representative assets in the security market, the decision maker may 
measure the covariance from historical return data of representative assets. The covariance so obtained is a 
proxy for the equilibrium covariance eZmZm
e
Z V,rF,rr )/(cov)(cov =  (assuming the market is in 
equilibrium)4 and the investor will therefore employ the equilibrium NPV or the equilibrium NFV. In both 
cases the decision maker is reliably supported by a pair of metrics that lead to correct decisions. 
  
3. Nonadditivity 
 
This section shows that the disequilibrium NFV and the equilibrium NPV are additive, whereas the 
disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are nonadditive. NPV additivity means 
 
2121
NPVNPVNPV Z ZZZ +=+   for any pair of projects Z1, Z2   (3.1) 
 
(analogously for the NFV). Therefore, to show nonadditivity it suffices to provide a counterexample, i.e. a 
pair of projects (or a class of pairs of projects) for which eq. (3.1) does not hold. 
 
Proposition 3.1 The disequilibrium NPV is nonadditive. 
 
Proof: Consider a pair of projects Z1 and Z2 such that Z1= ),( kh−  and Z2= ),( kFhI ZZ −+−  with h, k 
being any nonzero real numbers (note that Z= Z1 + Z2). Consider the function 
 
48476
444444 8444444 76
2Z
1Z
dNPV
dNPV
)(
),(cov)(:),( 







+−+












−
+
−
+−−=
f
Z
mZf
Z
Z R
kh
hI
rF
R
kFhIkhf λ . 
 
If the disequilibrium NPV were additive, then eq. (3.1) would hold and ),( khf  would be constant under 
changes in h and k  (in particular, we would have ),( khf = )0,0(f =dNPVZ  for all h, k). But 
 
                                                 
4
 If the market is not in equilibrium, the historical covariances are not proxies for the equilibrium covariances and one 
must relies on the previous method (disequilibrium covariance); however, in this case one should actually wonder 
whether the CAPM should be applied, given that equilibrium is a fundamental assumption of the model. This issue is 
an important practical problem but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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2)],(cov)([
)(),(cov),(
mZZf
ZmZ
rFhIR
kFrF
h
khf
λ
λ
+−
−
−=
∂
∂
 
 
)(
),(cov
11),(
hI
rFRRk
khf
Z
mZff
−
+
−=
∂
∂
λ  
which, in general, are not identically zero; therefore ),( khf  is not invariant with respect to h and k. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3.2 The equilibrium NPV is additive. 
 
Proof: Consider any pair of projects Z1 and Z2, with 1ZI  and  2ZI  being the respective outlays, while 1ZF  
and 2ZF  are the respective end-of-period outcomes. Let 21: ZZZ III +=  and 11: ZZZ FFF += . Using the 
certainty-equivalent form of the equilibrium NPV (see eq. (1.7)) we have 
 
ZZ
f
mZZ
Z
f
mZZ
Z
f
mZZ
ZZ
I
R
rFF
I
R
rFF
I
R
rFF
eNPV),cov(
),cov(),cov(
eNPVeNPV 2
22
1
11
21
=−
−
=
−
−
+−
−
=+
λ
λλ
 
Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 3.3. The disequilibrium NFV is additive. 
 
Proof: Reminding that )1(dNFV dZZZZ rIF +−=  (see Table 1) we have 
Z
mZZfZZ
ZmZ
Z
ZfZZmZ
Z
ZfZZZ
rFIrIF
IrF
I
IRFIrF
I
IRF
dNFV
),cov()(
)),cov(()),cov((dNFVdNFV 22
2
2211
1
1121
=
−−−=
−−+−−=+
λ
λλ
 
Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 3.4. The equilibrium NFV is nonadditive. 
 
Proof:  Consider a pair of projects Z1 and Z2 such that Z1= ),( kh−  and Z2= ),( kFhI ZZ −+−  with h, k 
being any nonzero real numbers (note that Z= Z1 + Z2). Taking into consideration eq. (1.10) and reminding 
that 0),cov( =mrk  for all Rk ∈ , consider the function  
( )448476
44444444444 844444444444 76
2Z
1
1
eNFV
eNFV
)(),cov()()(),( hrhkhI
V
rkF
rhIkFkhg fZe
Z
mZ
fZZ
Z
−−+










−








−
+−−−−=
λ
. 
Manipulating algebraically, we find 
e
Z
ZmZ
ZfZ
V
h))(I,r(Fλ
IRFkhg
1
cov),( −−−=  
with 
f
mZZe
Z
e
Z R
)k,r(FλkFkVV −−−== cov)(
11
 
so that  
)(
),cov(),(
1
kV
rF
h
khg
e
Z
mZλ
=
∂
∂
 
[ ]2)(
))(,cov(),(
1
kVR
hIrF
k
khg
e
Zf
mZ −
−=
∂
∂ λ
 
which, in general, are not identically zero. 
Q.E.D. 
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained, showing that additivity is, so to say, two-dimensional, depending 
on the two pairs equilibrium/disequilibrium and present/future. 
 
Table 3 illustrates a numerical example where a decision maker is supposed to be evaluating two risky 
projects. The security market is composed, for the sake of simplicity, of a single risky security (so that its 
rate of return coincides with the market rate of return mr ); one of three states of nature may occur with 
probabilities equal to 0.4, 0.3, 0.4 respectively. The risk-free security has a face value of 120 and a price of 
90. The risk-free rate is therefore 33.33% (=120/90-1). To compute the four net values, we use eqs. (1.5) 
(dNPV) and (1.7) (eNPV), while the dNFV (eq. (1.8)) and the eNFV (eq. (1.9)) are found by multiplying 
the former by )1( dZr+   and the latter by )1( eZr+  (eqs. (1.12) and (1.13)). Consistently with the 
Propositions above, the sum of the dNPVs (eNFVs) of the two projects is not equal to the dNPV (eNFV) of 
the project obtained by summing the two projects’ cash flows. Conversely, the eNPV and the dNFV are 
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additive, which confirms the economic interpretation of these indexes as valuation tools: eq. (2.6) just 
represents the eNPV as the price increase times the number of shares outstanding, which exactly measures 
the increase in shareholders’ wealth if project is undertaken. 
  
Remark 3.1 It is worth noting that the the dNFV and the eNPV are risk-free-related, so to say, in the sense 
that the equilibrium Net Present Value is just the discounted value of the disequilibrium Net Future Value, 
where the discount rate is the risk-free rate of the security market: 
 
eNPV),cov(
),cov(
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−
=
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Referring to the example of Table 3 and, in particular, to projects Z1  and Z2, we have 6.41=8.55/1.3333 and 
9.66=12.88/1.3333.) This fact may be interpreted in  an arbitrage perspective. Suppose a shareholder owns 
n shares of the firm; before acceptance of the project the value of his portfolio is lnP , after acceptance it 
becomes olnP . Suppose he sells m shares, with 
oo
lll PPPnm /)( −= ; then the value of his investment in 
the firm gets back to lll nPmPnP =−
oo
as before acceptance of the project. If he invests the proceeds at 
the risk-free rate, he will have, at the end of the period, a certain amount equal to  
 
dNFV)()( 
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where we have used eq. (2.6)  and eq. (3.2). By undoing the increase in the firm value, the investor will 
assure himself an arbitrage profit equal to that part of the dNFV corresponding to his investment in the 
firm. To put it differently, the dFNV is the (total) arbitrage profit shareholders get at the end of the period if 
the project is undertaken. 
 
Remark 3.2  The dNPV and the eNFV may only be used as decision rules.5 However, nonadditivity has 
something to do with decision as well. Given an investment, eq. (2.4) does hold, but dealing with two 
investments to be both accepted or rejected (or an investment composed of two sub-investments), one may 
not deduce that the portfolio of the two projects is profitable if the sum of the two NPVs is positive. In 
other words, before applying eq. (2.4), one must first consider the overall cash flows deriving from the two 
investments, and only afterwards compute the NPV. To calculate the NPV of each investment and then 
sum the NPVs is not compatible with Proposition 2.1. This boils down to saying that the disequilibrium 
NPV is dangerous if used for decision purposes, because decision makers coping with two or more projects 
                                                 
5
 Given that the disequilibrium Net Present Value and the equilibrium Net Future Value are not valuation tools, to use 
the term “value” for labelling them is admittedly improper. 
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(or a single project that is composed of several sub-projects) may be tempted to first compute the NPV of 
each project and then sum the NPVs. This procedure may lead to a different sign than the one obtained 
with the correct procedure. It is easy to show that there may be instances where the sign of 
21 ZNPVNPV +Z does not coincide with the sign of 21NPV ZZ + : consider again the example in Table 3 
and suppose the cost of project Z2 is equal to 48 (other things unvaried). A simple calculation shows that 
029.2)86.5(15.8dNPVdNPV
21 Z >=−+=+Z  while 084.1dNPV 21 <−=+ZZ  (i.e. this portfolio 
of projects is profitable or not depending on how the investor computes the overall NPV).  
 The same remarks obviously hold for the equilibrium NFV. For example, if one sets the cost of 
project Z2 at 45 euros (other things unvaried) we have 
089.3)77.10(88.6eNFVeNFV
21 Z <−=−+=+Z  and 05.1eNFV 21 >=+ZZ . 
 
 
 
4. Re-modelling the decision problem 
 
Though the dNPV and the eNFV are nonadditive, they are impeccably deducted from the CAPM 
assumptions. One may well dismiss them by invoking additivity. Additivity is a cardinal assumption in 
finance and nonadditive measures are unacceptable. However, in modelling a decision criterion, one should 
preferably obtain rather than assume additivity; that is, one should not resort to additivity as an ad hoc 
assumption to get rid of unpleasant (though logical) results: additivity should be a logical consequence of 
the criterion at hand. This section is devoted to showing that the dNPV and the eNFV cannot be logically 
derived the CAPM assumptions if the decision process is reframed in a more general way. 
 
First, note that Lemma 2.1 is based on a well-determined problem: 
 
An economic agent faces the opportunity of investing in project Z.          
Should the decision maker invest in Z or not?             (DP-1) 
 
The dichotomy is: undertake Z/do not undertake Z. Formally, the two alternatives are described in the 
equilibrium relations (2.2) and (2.3), which we rewrite below for the benefit of the reader: 
 
 
Z is undertaken → )(cov)( mZllllfZl ,rFFλPNNRFF +++=+ oo .    (2.3) 
 
Z is not undertaken →   ).(cov)(cov mlllfmllfl ,rFλPNR,rFλVRF +=+=   (2.2) 
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The difference between the two equations leads to eq. (2.1), which logically implies Propositions 2.1 and 
2.4 (which in turn legitimate the use of the dNPV and the eNFV for decision-making). Let us now change 
the framing of the problem into the following one: 
 
 
An economic agent faces the opportunity of investing in project Z or in project Y. 
Should the decision maker invest in Z or in Y?             (DP-2) 
 
The decision problem (DP-2) states that the decision maker faces two alternatives, named “project Z” and 
“project Y”. The problem (DP-2) is a generalization of (DP-1): the latter may be obtained by the former by 
stating that “project Y” is the null alternative, that is, a project with zero cash flows. It is just this general 
framing that prevents the dNPV and the eNFV to be deducted from the CAPM assumptions. 
 
Proposition 4.1. Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking 
either  project Z, which  costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF , or  project. Y, which  costs 
YI  and generates the end-of-period payoff YF .  The firm’s share price increases if and only if  project Z’s 
eNPV (respectively, dNFV) is greater than project Y’s eNPV (respectively, dNFV). 
 
Proof. If  Z is undertaken, the equilibrium relation will be 
Z is undertaken → )(cov)( mZllllfZl ,rFFλPNNRFF +++=+ oo .    (2.3) 
 
If Y is undertaken, an analogous equilibrium relation will hold, where Y  replaces Z: 
 
Y is undertaken → )(cov)( mYllllfYl ,rFFλPNNRFF +++=+ •• .         (2.3-bis) 
 
Subtracting (2.3-bis) from (2.3), one gets 
 
[ ] [ ] )()(cov)(cov •−=−−−−− lllfYfmYYZfmZZ PPNRIR,rFλFIR,rFλF o  
where we have used the equality Yll IPN =
••
. Therefore,  
 
[ ] )()()( •−=−−− lllfYeYZeZf PPNRIVIVR o    (4.1) 
so that   
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YZll PP eNPVeNPV ifonly  and if >>
•o
.    (4.2a) 
 
so proving the first part of the proposition. Owing to eq. (3.2). we also have 
 
YZll PP dNFVdNFV ifonly  and if >>
•o
    (4.2b) 
(as long as 0>fR ), so proving the second part. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Poposition 4.1 tells us that the decision rule deducted from the CAPM assumptions and (DP-2) is 
 
invest  in Z if and only if its  eNPV (dNFV) is greater than Y’s eNFV (dNFV). 
 
Corollary 4.1. Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking  
project Z, which  costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if project Z’s eNPV (resp. dNFV) is positive. 
 
Proof. The assumptions are the same as in Proposition 4.1, with Ybeing the null alternative (with cash 
flows equal to zero). Then, the net present value in (4.2a) (the net finale value in (4.2b)) is zero, and the 
criterion becomes 
 
 
  invest  in Z if and only if the eNPV (dNFV) is positive. 
Q.E.D. 
 
 
We now prove that eqs. (2.4) and (2.10) cannot be deduced from (DP-2) 
 
 Proposition 4.2. Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking 
either  project Z, which  costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF  or  project. Y, which  costs 
YI  and generates the end-of-period payoff YF . The dNPV rule and the eNFV rule cannot be derived. 
 
Proof. As seen, problem (DP-2) implies eqs. (2.3) and (2.3-bis). If the dNPV rule is deductable 
from these equations, then it must be 
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However, this excludes the case where Y is the null alternative, because IY cannot be zero. 
Furthermore, subtracting (2.3-bis) from (2.3) and manipulating, one gets to 
 
)()(cov)( •−=





−
−
+−−− llflm
YZ
YZfYZYZ PPRN,rII
FF
λRIIFF o  
whence 
Y
m
YZ
YZf
Y
Z
m
YZ
YZf
Z
ll I
,r
II
FF
λR
F
I
,r
II
FF
λR
F
PP −
−
−
+
>−
−
−
+
> •
)(cov)(cov
se solo e se o  (4.4) 
which is not equivalent to (4.3) . As for the eNFV rule to be valid, it must be 
  
Y
e
YYYZ
e
ZZZll IrIFIrIFPP −−>−−>
• )()(ifonly  and ifo .  (4.5) 
 
But subtracting (2.3-bis) from (2.3) and using the equalities fejmjj RV,rFλF =− )(cov  and 
ej
jej
V
F
r =+1 ,  j=Z, Y,  algebraic manipulations lead to 
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which is not equivalent to (4.5). 
Q.E.D. 
 
The eNFV and the dNPV rule are thus removed with no need of invoking additivity: simply, they are not 
deductable from the CAPM assumptions if the decision problem is (DP-2), which transforms (and 
generalizes) the dychotomy “undertake Z/do not undertake Z” into “undertake Z/undertake Y”.  
 
5. Decreasing net values and project valuation 
 
The previous sections have shown that only the eNPV and the dNFV are legitimately deducted from the 
CAPM and an appropriate decision problem: they are deducted not only as decision rules but also as 
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valuation tools. In other words, they provide the project value (current and future respectively). This 
section shows that, despite their additivity, the eNPV or dNFV may be misleading in some cases. 
 Consider a project whose random end-of-period payoff is RF kZ ∈  if state k occurs, k=1, 2, …, n.  
The project disequilibrium NFV and the project equilibrium NPV may be represented as functions of n 
variables: 
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(5.2) 
where pk is the probability of state k. For functions (5.1) and (5.2) to provide correct (net) values, they must 
abide by the no-arbitrage principle. In other words, increasing end-of-period cash flows should lead to 
increasing values, ceteris paribus. Consider two assets Z and W that may be purchased at the same price. 
Suppose kW
k
Z FF =  for all k but s, with 
s
W
s
Z FF < . Asset W  may then be seen as asset Z plus an arbitrage 
profit paying off nonnegative amounts in all states and a strictly positive amount ( sZsW FF − ) in state s. 
Asset W’s value must therefore be higher than asset Z’s, otherwise arbitrage opportunities arise.6 From a 
capital budgeting perspective, given a determined eNPV and dNFV for project Z, project W must have 
higher eNPV and dNFV (assuming their costs are equal), which boils down to 0dNFV >
∂
∂
k
ZF
 and 
0eNPV >
∂
∂
k
ZF
 for every k=1, 2, … , n. If, instead, the project under consideration is such that  
0dNFV <
∂
∂
s
ZF
  and  0eNPV <
∂
∂
s
ZF
 for some s    (5.3) 
                                                 
6From a stochastic dominance perspective, note that asset W dominates Z according to both first-order and second-
order stochastic dominance). 
 20 
the dNFV and the eNPV do not provide a reliable valuation, because they are inconsistent with the no-
arbitrage principle. From eq. (5.1) we have that 

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and, owing to eq. (3.2), 
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Also, it is evident that  
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with  rmk being the market rate of return if state k occurs. Therefore, we may write 
 
smmssss
Z
prrpp
F
λλ +−=
∂
∂ dNFV   and  fsmmssss
Z
Rprrpp
F
/)(eNPV λλ +−=
∂
∂
. (5.8) 
 
Let us now consider project Z in Table 4. Considering its dNFV and eNPV as functions of 3ZF  (end-of-
period cash flow if state 3 occurs) and using eq. (5.8), we find that condition (5.3) is satisfied for s=3:  
0)6259.08518.0)(3.0(52.43.0dNFV3 <−−=∂
∂
ZF
 
[ ] 0)6259.08518.0)(3.0(52.43.0
3333.1
1
eNPV3 <−−=∂
∂
ZF
. 
This means “the more the payoff, the less the value”, which is incompatible with an arbitrage-free 
evaluation. Note that project Z may be seen as the risky security plus an arbitrage profit that pays off 
nonnegative cash flows in all states and a strictly positive amount of 250 if state 3 occurs.7  Therefore, 
project Z must have a higher (net) value than the risky security. Given that the net values of the risky 
security are zero (for the risky security lies on the SML), project Z’s net values must be positive. Both first-
order and second-order stochastic dominance confirm the natural intuition according to which Z dominates 
                                                 
7
 It is possible to set the project’s cost lower than the risky security’s price, so that the arbitrage becomes a strong 
arbitrage, with a positive net cash flow at time 0 and nonnegative amount (possibly positive) at time 1. 
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the risky security. Yet, both the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are negative. They signal 
nonprofitability for project Z (the equilibrium value is 52.808, smaller than the cost) or, equivalently, they 
do not signal that the project gives the investor an arbitrage opportunity. This means that, if the dNPV and 
the eNFV are not additive, the eNPV and the dNFV have pitfalls as well, even though they are additive.  
 
This enables us to state the following  
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that  
(a) the security market is in equilibrium 
(b) condition (5.3) holds, i.e. 0dNFV <
∂
∂
s
ZF
  and  0eNPV <
∂
∂
s
ZF
 for some s 
Then, the eNPV and the dNFV may not be used for valuation (nor decision) purposes. 
 
Proposition 5.1 bears relation to a previous result found by Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982, p. 237). The 
authors, dealing with pricing of marketed assets in a complete market, prove the following: 
 
Dybivg and Ingersoll’s Proposition (DIP). 
Suppose that 
 (i) mean-variance pricing holds for all assets, that is, )cov( mlfl ,rrλrr =−  with 0, >λr f  
 (ii) markets are complete so that any payoff across states can be purchased as some  portfolio 
of marketed securities; and  
 (iii) the market portfolio generates sufficiently large returns in some state(s), that is, 
 0)/1( prob >+> λrr mm . 
Then there exists an arbitrage opportunity. 
 
Remark 5.1 It is worth noting that condition (b) of Proposition 4.1 is equivalent to Dybvig and Ingersoll’s 
condition (iii), because 0)/1( prob >+> λrr mm  if and only if λrr mms /1+>  for some s, which means 
1)( >− mms rrλ  for some s, and, owing to eq. (4.8) and the fact that ps > 0 and Rf > 0, the latter holds if and 
only if 0dNFV <
∂
∂
s
ZF
 and 0dNFV <
∂
∂
s
ZF
 for some s.8 As a result, the two assumption (a) and (b) in 
Proposition 4.1 imply that the market is not complete. To understand why, consider that if the market were 
complete and (b) held, then condition (ii) and (iii)  of DIP would hold. But then the market would not be in 
equilibrium, otherwise arbitrage opportunities would arise (see Dybvig and Ingersoll, 1982, p. 238). 
Therefore assumptions (a) and (b) are only compatible with an incomplete market. 
                                                 
8
 The implicit assumption is that 0>λ . If not, the two conditions are not equivalent. In our particular case described 
in Table 4, we have  102.1)6259.08518.0(52.4)( 3 >=−=− mm rrλ . 
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The result presented in Proposition 5.1 is, so to say, the capital-budgeting counterpart of DIP. In particular, 
while the latter deals with pricing of marketed assets when the security market is complete, the former 
deals with valuation of nonmarketed assets (projects) when the security market is incomplete. The two 
Propositions are the two sides of the same coin and the two perspectives are perfectly reconciled (see Table 
5).  
 
6. Equilibrium value and counterfactual equilibrium price 
 
This section shows that the equilibrium value of a project is not necessarily the value the project would 
have if it were traded.  
 Let us consider eq. (1.7) in section 1 above. It says that the eNPV is just the difference between the 
equilibrium value and the cost of the project: ZeZ IV −=eNPV  where 
 
f
mZZe
Z R
rFF
V
),(covλ−
= .     (6.1) 
In finance, eZV  is known as the “equilibrium value” of the project. It is commonly believed that it is the 
price the project would have in equilibrium if it were traded in the security market (e.g. Mason and Merton, 
1985, pp. 38-39, Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 800).  But this equivalence does not always hold, as Smith and 
Nau (1995) clearly point out: 
 We also have some semantic problems defining exactly what is meant by the value of a non-traded 
 project. Earlier the … value of a project was defined as the price the project would have  if it were 
 traded in an arbitrage-free market …. This definition does not work well in general because the 
 introduction of the project into the market may create new investment opportunities and change  the 
 prices of the traded securities. (Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 804, footnote 7) 
 
Let us call “counterfactual equilibrium price” the price the project would have if it were traded: we now 
illustrate a counterexample where the equilibrium value eZV  differs from the counterfactual equilibrium 
price. Let us consider project Z introduced in Table 4. What if one counterfactually assumes that Z  is 
traded in the security market?9 First of all, note that the introduction of the project in the security market 
renders the latter a complete market. It is thus evident that project Z’s counterfactual equilibrium price 
cannot coincide with the equilibrium value 808.52=eZV  previously found, otherwise conditions (i)-(iii) of 
DIP would be satisfied, and arbitrage opportunities would arise (which implies that the market would not 
be in equilibrium). This means that when the project is introduced in the security market, market prices 
                                                 
9
 This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that a security with the same payoff as project Z is traded in the 
market. 
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shift so that the market moves toward a new equilibrium. How does the resulting new equilibrium turns out 
to be? Intuition would tell us that the risky security’s price should decrease to avoid arbitrage (given that 
the project dominates it), but this is not the case. It is easy to verify that, to avoid condition (iii) of DIP and 
achieve an equilibrium, the risky security’s price must increase and project Z’s equilibrium price must 
increase to a larger extent so as to be greater than the risky security’s price.10 Suppose the new equilibrium 
is as represented in Table 6.  The (counterfactual) equilibrium price of project Z is 121.57 and the price of 
the risky security is now 65.76.  The market is now complete and arbitrage is not possible. The 
counterfactual equilibrium price of the project differs from the equilibrium value of the project 
(121.57 ≠ 52.808). The conclusion is that the equilibrium value in eq. (6.1) is not the price the project 
would have if it were traded in the market. Contrary to the equilibrium value, the counterfactual 
equilibrium price is rational by definition, in the sense that arbitrage is not possible in the resulting 
equilibrium. This means that the counterfactual equilibrium price is obviously the correct value of the 
project. 
 One might think that, for valuation to be correct, one should replace the equilibrium value with the 
counterfactual equilibrium price. Unfortunately the counterfactual equilibrium price cannot be univocally 
determined. Table 7 shows another possible equilibrium for the market where project Z is traded. The 
equilibrium counterfactual price in this second equilibrium is equal to 76.197, which not simply conflicts 
with the equilibrium value of the project, but differs form the counterfactual equilibrium price previously 
found. Which one of the two counterfactual equilibrium prices is the one to be used for valuation? The 
answer is not possible, because there is no way of anticipating how equilibrium is reached from a 
disequilibrium situation. That is, one cannot compute ex ante “the” equilibrium price the project would 
have if it were traded in the security market. However, from a practical point of view, one may collect 
statistical data and make an ex ante estimation of the most probable equilibrium the market would reach. In 
this case, the estimated counterfactual equilibrium price could be taken as the correct project value.11 
 
Remark 5.1 Proposition 5.1 just gives us the reason why the equilibrium value may sometimes turn out to 
be incorrect. The correct value measuring increase in shareholders’ wealth is indeed given by the 
equilibrium value if the market is complete and in equilibrium. Problems in project valuation arise only 
when the market is not complete and condition (5.3) holds.12 In this case, equilibrium value and 
counterfactual equilibrium price are not equal.  A project’s equilibrium value is therefore reliable only if 
                                                 
10
 This result holds regardless of the number of shares of project Z (or of the security having the same payoff as Z) 
that are traded in the market. 
11
 From a theoretical point of view, upper and lower bound can be computed for the counterfactual equilibrium price 
(Smith and Nau, 1995), but whenever the cost is greater than the lower limit and smaller than the upper limit, the 
“optimal strategy is unclear”(Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 805), and decision is not possible (a further analysis must be 
conducted to reach a single estimated value). 
12
 It is worth reminding that if the market is complete and in equilibrium, condition (5.3) may not hold (given that the 
equivalent condition (iii) of DIP may not hold). Conversely, if the market is not complete and in equilibrium, 
condition (5.3) may hold, as we have seen. 
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the market is complete; in this case it does represent the (counterfactual) equilibrium price that the project 
would actually have if it were traded. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The CAPM is a theoretical model aimed at valuing financial assets in a security market under the 
assumption that the market is in equilibrium. As widely known, the CAPM may also be used as a decision 
criterion: an investment is worth undertaking if and only if the investment expected rate of return is greater 
than the (cost-based) risk-adjusted cost of capital (Rubinstein, 1973).  However, the role of this simple 
criterion has not been thoroughly investigated, so that errors and misunderstanding often arise in financial 
textbooks and papers, where the CAPM is incorporated in the net present value criterion in an unclear way, 
with no explicit indication of  
o the way it should be computed (use of disequilibrium data versus equilibrium data), 
o the purpose it serves (decision or valuation) 
o the relation excess return (net future value) bears to present value. 
 
This paper, focusing on accept-reject situations and one-period projects, aims at providing a clarification of 
these issues. In particular, it shows that: 
 
• from the CAPM four decision rules are validly deducted: the disequilibrium Net Present Value, the 
equilibrium Net Future Value, the equilibrium Net Present Value, the disequilibrium Net Future 
Value. All of them may be interchangeably used for decision-making 
• while logically impeccable as decision tools, the disequilibrium NPV (equilibrium NFV) may lead 
to incorrect decisions if decision makers facing a portfolio of several projects (or a project 
composed of several sub-projects) separately compute each project’s NPV (NFV) and then sum the 
values obtained. The correct procedure is: to sum the cash flows of the projects and then compute 
the disequilibrium NPV (equilibrium NFV) 
• only the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are additive, which means that they may be 
used for valuation purposes. The other two are not valuation tools, because they are nonadditive 
• the deduction of the disequilibrium NPV (equilibrium NFV) from the CAPM assumptions is 
possible because the decision problem is shaped as “undertake Z/do not undertake Z”. If the 
problem is reframed in a more general way as “undertake Z/undertake Y”, the two nonadditive 
decision rules may not be deducted from the CAPM assumptions 
• even if the market is in equilibrium, the project’s equilibrium NPV and disequilibrium NFV lead to 
an incorrect valuation whenever they are decreasing functions with respect to end-of-period cash 
flow in some state of nature (which implies that the security market is incomplete). This result is 
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the capital-budgeting equivalent of Dybvig and Ingersoll’s (1982) result, which they find under the 
assumption of a complete market 
• if the above stated condition holds, the correct value would be given by the (counterfactual) 
equilibrium price the project would have if it were traded in the security market. Unfortunately, 
this price is not univocally determined ex ante and one can only rely on an estimated equilibrium 
price based on exogenous data about the market. 
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Table 0. Main Notational Conventions 
)( jj FF  
 
Asset j’s end-of-period random (expected) cash flow 
 
jI  Cost of project j 
)( jj rr  Asset j’s random (expected) rate of return 
)( djej VV  Equilibrium (disequilibrium) value of asset j 
d
Zr  
Disequilibrium (cost-based) rate of return of project Z (aka risk-adjusted cost 
of capital) 
e
Zr ( eYr ) Equilibrium rate of return of project Z (Y) 
)( ff Rr  Risk-free rate (1+risk-free rate) 
2
mσ  
Variance of the market rate of return 
cov Covariance 
2:
m
fm rr
σ
λ
−
=  Market price of risk 
lP  Price of firm l’s shares before acceptance of the project 
)( •ll PPo  Price of firm l’s shares before acceptance of project Z (Y) 
lN  Number of firm l’s outstanding shares 
o
lN  ( •lN ) Additional shares issued at price olP  ( •lP ) to finance project  Z (Y) 
lV   Firm value before acceptance of the project 
o
lV  Firm value after acceptance of project Z 
dNPVj, eNPVj Disequilibrium (equilibrium) net present value of project j 
dNFVj, eNFVj Disequilibrium (equilibrium) net future value of project j 
j=Z, Y, Z1, Z2, l, m 
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Table 1. Equilibrium and disequilibrium net values 
 Equilibrium Disequilibrium 
Net Present Value 
 
Ze
Z
Z I
r
F
−
+ )1(
 
e
Z
e
ZZZ
r
rrI
+
−
1
)(
 
 
 
Zd
Z
Z I
r
F
−
+ )1(
 
d
Z
d
ZZZ
r
rrI
+
−
1
)(
 
 
Net Future Value 
(excess return) 
 
)1( eZZZ rIF +−  
 
)( eZZZ rrI −  
 
 
)1( dZZZ rIF +−  
 
)( dZZZ rrI −  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Additive and nonadditive net values 
 
Equilibrium Disequilibrium 
Net Present Value Additive Nonadditive 
Net Future Value Nonadditive Additive 
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Table 3. Project valuation with the CAPM 
 
 Proj. Z1 Proj. Z2 Proj. Z1+ Z2 
Proj. Z1                               
+Proj. Z2 
Risky 
security 
Risk-free 
security 
Market 
(3000 sh.) 
F  





10
100
130
 





80
50
120
 





90
150
250
 
 





100
71
98
 





120
120
120
 





300000
213000
294000
 
Cost/price 70 30 100  54 90 162000 
Rate of return 
(%) 
 





− 7.85
8.42
7.85
 
 





6.166
6.66
300
 





−10
50
150
 
 





18.85
48.31
48.81
 





3.33
3.33
3.33
 





18.85
48.31
48.81
 
F  82 80 162  87.8 120 263400 
r  (%) 17.14 166.66 62  62.59 33.33 62.59 
λ  4.52       
),cov( mrFλ  –19.88 27.12 7.23  15.8 0 47400 
),cov( mrFF λ−
 
82 80 162  87.8 120 263400 
Disequilibrium 
value 
78.15 35.75 115.25 113.9 54 90 162000 
Equilibrium 
value 
76.41 39.66 116.07 116.07 54 90 162000 
Disequilibrium 
NPV 
8.15 5.75 15.24 13.9 0 0 0 
Equilibrium 
NPV 
6.41 9.66 16.07 16.07 0 0 0 
Disequilibrium 
NFV 
8.55 12.88 21.43 21.43 0 0 0 
Equilibrium 
NFV 
6.88 19.49 22.44 26.37 0 0 0 
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Table 4. Decreasing net values 
 
 Project Z Risky 
security 
Risk-free 
security 
Market (000,000) 
(3 mil. shares) Probability 
F  





350
71
98
 





100
71
98
 





120
120
120
 





300
213
294
 





3.0
4.0
3.0
 
Cost/Price  54 54 90 162  
r  (%) 





1.548
48.31
48.81
 





18.85
48.31
48.81
 





3.33
3.33
3.33
 





18.85
48.31
48.81
 





3.0
4.0
3.0
 
r  (%) 201.48 62.59 33.33 62.59  
F  162.8 87.8 120 263.4  
),cov( mrF  20.44 3.49 0 10.486  
λ  4.52     
),cov( mrFλ  92.39 15.8 0 47.4  
),cov( mrFF λ−  70.41 72 120 216  
eV  52.808 54 90 162  
Equilibrium NPV –1.19 0 0 0  
Disequilibrium NFV –1.59 0 0 0  
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Table 5. Range of applicability of DIP and Proposition 4.1 
 
Security market Type of assets 
Dybvig and Ingersoll’s Proposition Complete Securities (marketed assets) 
Proposition 4.1 Incomplete Projects (nonmarketed assets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Project Z is traded in the market (first equilibrium) 
 
 
Project is traded  in the 
Market (1 share) 
Risky security 
(3 mil. Shares) 
Risk-free 
security 
 
Market  
(000,000) 
 
Probability 
F  





350
71
98
 





100
71
98
 





120
120
120
 





000350.300
000071.213
000098.294
 





3.0
4.0
3.0
 
Price  121.57 65.76 90 197.28  
r  (%) 33.91 33.51 33.33 33.51  
NPV 0 0 0 0  
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Table 7. Project Z is traded in the market (second equilibrium) 
 
 
Project is traded  in the 
Market (1 share) 
Risky security  
(3 mil. shares) 
Risk-free 
security 
 
Market  
(000,000) 
 
Probability 
F  





350
71
98
 





100
71
98
 





120
120
120
 





000350.300
000071.213
000098.294
 





3.0
4.0
3.0
 
Price  76.197 58 90 174  
r  (%) 113.65 51.37 33.33 51.37  
NPV 0 0 0 0  
 
